Periodic Report Outcome 19.10.11

Ireland’s Universal Periodic Review took place in Geneva recently where Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence, Mr. Alan Shatter defended Ireland’s human rights record. Delegations of other United Nations countries put questions to the minister and made recommendations on how Ireland could improve shortcomings in the human rights area.

Of particular interest to us, is that the government have expressed their commitment to reducing the time taken to process applications for citizenship to an average of six months. It was also commented that the implementation of citizenship ceremonies demonstrated a positive attribute to welcoming new citizens into Ireland.

The United Nations outcome report on Ireland was adopted on Monday 10^th of October by the government and included 126 recommendations. Some of the noteworthy recommendations include that all asylum seekers in Ireland should be able to effectively accede to the process of determination of their refugee condition and that decisions on the necessity for international protection be reviewed and be subject to independent judicial supervision.

It was also suggested that practical and legal measures are adopted  to curb racial discrimination and discrimination against migrants and to look at the appeal by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) to ratify the 1960 Convention to counter discrimination in the area of education.

It was also interesting to note the suggestion to extend the remit of the Ombudsman to children in prison and asylum seeking children.

It is hoped that these recommendations will be adopted and allow Ireland to improve the current shortcomings in the area.



The Naturalisation Process, Ireland and the United Kingdom compared

We have recently made submissions to the Minister on behalf of a client who is waiting a determination of his application for Naturalization for a period of over four years and four months. It has been indicated that to us that our client’s application for Naturalization is being considered “in the normal way” with a view to be establishing that he has met the statutory requirements for Naturalization.

We cannot accept this response as reasonable or adequate in the circumstances of our client’s case.   He does not present as a person who would potentially be ineligible for Naturalization pursuant to the Statutory requirements of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Acts 1956 to 2004. He has lawfully resided in the State for over ten years. He is married to and EU national. He is a highly qualified person, and has always been in employment in this State. He has never come to the adverse attention to the Gardai in the State or any other country.

We recently wrote to the Minister to request to know why is this application taking over twice as long to process as the average application? Why is he being discriminated against compared to the average applicant? What has the Department been doing while processing his application over the course of four years and four months? When can our client expect to complete the processing of this application? We also indicated that we have submitted many applications for  Naturalization whereby the applicant has been found not to meet the criteria of the Citizenship Acts and these applications have been determined in periods of time far less than this client.

It was indicated to us in a responding correspondence from the Citizenship Section that should our client issue court proceedings in an attempt to compel the Minister to determine the application, that he would strictly be pursued for costs. This assertion was based on a number of judgments from the High Court from 2009 and 2010 where it was held that because Naturalization is a privilege, an applicant can not compel the Minister to determine the application  (Nawaz versus Minister for Justice, 29^th July 2009, Bepo v versus Minister for Justice 18^th June 2009, Tabi versus Minister for Justice  16^th April 2010 and Jiad versus Minister for Justice 19^th May 2010  ).

Thus, there is nothing an applicant such as our client can do put continue to wait without any understanding regarding why his application is being treated so unfavourably.

It is interesting to compare the UK Naturalization process.

Currently, the granting of a Certificate of Naturalisation is at the discretion of the Home Office. Applicants are required to be aged 18 years or over, of sound mind, intend to continue living in the United Kingdom or to maintain close links with the United Kingdom, be able to communicate in English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic to an acceptable degree, be of good character, meet certain residential requirements of five years or three years – with conditions attached to each. Applicants are also required

to have sufficient knowledge of life in the United Kingdom (with the exception of those who are over 65 years of age or are suffering from a long term mental condition preventing them from being tested on their knowledge ).

Applicants are entitled to have an acknowledgement receipt of their application within a number of weeks of submitting the application, and Applicants can accept to receive a determination of the application within a six month period. Applicants may also be required to attend an interview.

The Home Office has recently introduced strict new requirements which potential applicants will be required to meet in order to meet the criteria necessary to be approved. Applicants will now be required to have knowledge of British history in order to pass the citizenship test. Prime Minister David Cameron has noted the fact that the current test examines knowledge about the roles and powers of the main institutions of Europe and the benefits system in the United Kingdom. He is hopeful that the new test will be centred on British history and culture. It is thought that the new rule requiring knowledge of British history may prove to be a significantly more difficult obstacle for those who seek to be accepted as citizens of the United Kingdom in the future.

There is no similar requirement for knowledge of Irish history for Naturalisation in Ireland. Applications are decided upon by the Minister for Justice and Equality, who enjoys absolute discretion. Many of the general requirements are similar to the United Kingdom such as the requirement to be aged 18 or older and of good character. Applicant must intend to reside in the state after naturalisation, make a declaration of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the state, to undertake to observe the laws of the state and respect democratic values. One is also expected to be supporting themselves and their dependents while living in the state when they make their application.

The great difficulty with the Irish Naturalisation process is that it is the complete lack of  transparency. This allows for blatant disregard for fair procedures like the example of the case above.

IMMIGRATION DEBATE AT TCD CAUSES CONTROVERSY

A debate entitled “This house believes that Immigration in Ireland has gone too far,” due to be held on 20^th October by Trinity College’s Philosophical Society has been cancelled following a protest from far-left activists which severely threatened the safety of students.

The debate was to be hosted by British National Party MEP Nick Griffin who consequently decided to write a letter of complaint to a number of honorary patrons of the prestigious society such as Sir Bob Geldolf, former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Mr Griffin has branded the incident as “an attack on free speech.”

The seriousness and the enormous media coverage on the matter has highlighted that immigration remains a controversial subject in Ireland.  

Brophy Solicitors

20.10.11

PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE SOCIAL INCLUSION OF IMMIGRANTS IN IRELAND

In a bid to improve the current Irish Immigration process, new legislation has been proposed by the Integration Centre, which is supported by Atlantic Philanthropies Ireland Ltd, the One Foundation and the Citizens Information Board. The report was created with the aim of tackling racist crime and improving social inclusion of immigrants in Ireland.

The report lists 36 roadblocks to integration in Ireland on matters such as education, politics and healthcare, furthermore it suggests 78 solutions, all of which (bar introduction of intercultural studies into the school curriculum) should cost the state just under €10 million. In the report the Integration Centre also mentions how Irish immigrants are more likely to be unemployed, earn less and are more at risk of poverty.  

Amongst 10 top goals to be fulfilled by October 2012 is the banning of terms such as “naturalisation” and “bogus asylum seeker,” as well as improvements to current Junior and Leaving Cert subjects, which will assist with integration and implementing of intercultural studies. One of the fundamental aims of the report is to promote integration at a young age and so it seems that many changes may be made to our current education system in a bid to tackle the issue early- on.

All in all, if the legislation is implemented this will be a huge development in this sector of our society and a welcome improvement by immigrants who successfully obtain citizenship in Ireland. 

Constitutional challenge to establish right of Irish Citizens to the company of dependant Non EEA parents

We have previously blogged about this case when it was first heard before Mr Justice Hogan in July 2011.Over the last two days, the substantive hearing of the case was heard by Mr Justice Cooke. Submissions are now complete, and we must now await the High Court's decision.

The case concerned an Irish citizen couple who have applied for permission to remain in the State for their non EEA elderly parents, who we say are dependant upon them. 

The legal argument was focused on whether Article 41 of the Constitution, which guarantees the protection of the family as the "natural primary and fundamental unit group of society" , extends to include an adult Irish citizen and their elderly dependant parents. We argued that it does, and where dependency exists between the adult citizen and their parents, Article 41 protects the Irish citizen's right to the company of their parents, in the absence of reasonable and legitimate countervailing grounds which the State may raise. The State's position was that Article 41 offered no protection to our clients whether or not dependency existed, because our clients did not constitute a family unit within the meaning of Article 41. In other words, they argued that as an adult married citizen, one can no longer regard one's parents to be part of the family unit as envisaged by Article 41. A second argument was made that the dependency link in our clients' case was not sufficient to amount to dependency in legal terms.

There is no authority in Irish law to date to establish whether a family comprising of two married couples (i.e. the married Irish citizen and the married non EEA dependant parents) derive protection from Article 41, and if so, whether such protection would require the State to grant the dependant parents permission to reside in the State. Therefore, this case was argued on novel Constitutional grounds, and if successful, could establish a very significant new Constitutional right.

We eagerly await Mr Justice Cooke's judgement, and will post a further update at that time.

Brophy Solicitors

19.10.11

ONE TO WATCH! PRELIMINARY REFERENCE ON THE RESIDENCE RIGHTS OF PARENTS

The Upper Tribunal in the UK made a preliminary reference last week to the Court of Justice of the European Union on the rights of residence of parents with children over 21 years who they are caring for. 

In Alarape and anr (Article 12, EC Reg 1612/68) Nigeria [2011] UKUT 00413(IAC) (AIRE Centre intervening)  the Tribunal held that the term "child" in Article 12 of Regulation (EEC No.1612/68  (now Article 10 Regulation (EU) No. 492/2011) which guarantees a right of access to education - should be interpreted to include "stepchild".

The Tribunal also referred a series of questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, including:

1.     For a parent to qualify as a “primary carer” so as to derive a right of residence from a child over 21 exercising a right of access to education under Article 12 Regulation No. 1612/68 [see now Article 10 Regulation (EU) No. 492/2011], is it necessary for that child to be (i) dependent on such a parent; (ii) residing in that parent’s household; and (iii) receiving emotional support from that parent?  

2.     If in order to qualify for such a derived right of residence it is unnecessary for a parent to show that all three of the above circumstances obtain, is it sufficient to show that only one obtains or that only two obtain?

3.     In relation to (ii) above, can there continue to be residence on the part of an adult student child in a common household with his parent(s) even when the former is living away from home for the duration of his studies (save for holidays and occasional weekends)?

4.     In relation to (iii) above, is it necessary for the emotional support provided by the parent to be of a particular quality (viz. close or physically proximate) or is it sufficient if it consists in a normal emotional tie between a parent and an adult child?

5.     Where a person has held an EU right of residence under Article 12 of Regulation No. 1612/68 [see now Article 10 Regulation (EU) No. 492/2011] for a continuous period of more than five years, does such residence qualify for the purposes of acquiring a right of permanent residence under Chapter IV of Directive 2004/38/EC (the Citizens Directive) on “Right of Permanent Residence) and being issued with a residence card under Article 19 of the same Directive?

While it is likely to be some time before the Court provides guidance on the above questions, such clarification will be helpful in ascertaining to what extent applicants can derive a right of residence arising from their relationship with their children, irrespective of the fact that they are no longer minor children. Our current experience is that the Department is reluctant to take into account a relationship between a parent and an adult child, even where emotional ties and dependencies are evidenced. A parent, relying on EU Treaty Rights, will ordinarily need to advance independent grounds before the Department to be successful in retaining their right to reside.

We will keep you updated on the progress of this reference and look forward to hearing any comments you might have.

Brophy Solicitors

18.10.11

PROPOSED REFERENDUM ON CHILDRENS' RIGHTS PLANNED FOR NEW YEAR

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that states act in the best interests of the child. Ireland is a signatory to the Convention and ratified it since 1992. States that ratify it are bound to it by international law. In 2006, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in Geneva expressed concern that the wording of the Irish Constitution does not allow the state to intervene in cases of abuse, other than in very exceptional cases. Therefore, the Irish Government undertook to amend the Constitution to make a more explicit commitment to children’s rights.

In his recent address to other UN member states in Geneva as part of Ireland’s Universal Periodic Review, Minister Alan Shatter said that the referendum on children’s rights will be held early in the new year. The announcement was welcomed by many groups such as Barnardos, CARI, the Children’s Rights Alliance, The Dublin Rape Crisis Centre, ISPCC, One in Four and the Rape Crisis Network of Ireland. The Irish Council for Civil Liberties said that a more definitive date was needed.

The proposed wording for a referendum on children says the following:

‘In the resolution of all disputes concerning the guardianship, adoption, custody, care or upbringing of a child, the welfare and best interests of the child shall be first and paramount consideration.’

The proposed amendment will bring Irish law in line with the current UK position, as confirmed by the recent Court of Human Rights judgement in the case of ZH (Tanzania) (concerning the removal of a non-British parent of a UK citizen child). The Court of Human Rights held that the over-arching issue is the weight to be given to the best interests of children who are affected by the decision to remove or deport one or both of their parents from the UK. In the words of Lady Hale:

‘In making the proportionality assessment under article 8, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration. This means that they must be considered first.”

The new Constitutional provision may have quiet an impact in the immigration field and the exact wording of the proposal amendment is of much interest to us.  For example, the inclusion of the word ‘upbringing’ gives scope for the argument that children have rights to be brought up in the country of their nationality. This would be a novel right under Irish law, given the current position as set down by the Supreme Court in the case of L and O case  (Lobe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2003] IESC 3 (23 January 2003). In that case the Supreme Court held that requirements of the common good, including the need to preserve the integrity of the asylum and immigration process, could justify the deportation of a parent of a citizen child and a denial of the child’s right to the care and company of their parents in the State. 

The proposed wording of the new Constitutional provision gives room to argue that the deportation of an Irish citizen child could be deemed unconstitutional if it was not in the best interests of the child’s upbringing. Could it not be argued that in most cases a child would be better off to be brought up in a developed country like Ireland, than many developing countries where standard of life may be of a lesser quality? Could it be argued that the rights of the child extend not only to parents, but other immediate family members, such as siblings?

Certainly, some discussion is necessary on how a balance may be struck between achieving the protection of the rights of children and permitting the State to act within its required duty to protect the Immigration and welfare systems. We believe that the upcoming referendum is a good opportunity to assess these sometimes conflicting rights of the State and individuals. It is an opportunity to create and improve current policy in respect of the rights of children, and their position in society.  We welcome the implementation of children’s rights into the Constitution and the State’s commitment to ensuring that children are protected and a statement by the people of Ireland about the type of society in which we would like to live.

Brophy Solicitors

14.10.11

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[1] ZH (Tanzania)  (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) [2011] UKSC

UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW

This October saw Ireland examined for the first time by other United Nations (UN) countries on our human rights record. The process is called Universal Periodic Review.  It is a process where the human rights record of the United Nations 192 member states are reviewed and assessed every four years. It is an important part of reminding states of their responsibility to fully respect and implement all human rights and fundamental freedoms. As noted by Ban Ki – moon, UN secretary General, the Universal Periodic Review ‘has great potential to promote and protect human rights in the darkest corners of the world.’ 

Minister Alan Shatter personally attended the United Nations Geneva Head Quarters on the 6^th October 2011 to answer questions on Ireland’s human rights record as Ireland submitted to its first ever ‘Universal Periodic Review’. In his opening address, Minister Shatter made specific references to both the positives and negatives of Ireland’s human rights record. Of particular interest to us was his specific reference to the unacceptable delays in the Naturalization process. He confirmed that he was taking steps to rectify this problem, and aimed in due course to have all applications dealt with within a six month period. He acknowledged criticism for the lack of appeal process to decisions of Naturalization applications, but confirmed that he reviewed all decisions and therefore there was no higher authority to determine appeals.  He cited the new Citizenship ceremonies as a positive step towards welcoming and celebrating newly declared citizens. 

Questions were then put to the Minister from each represented member state focusing on human rights issues of concern in Ireland today including children’s rights, access to abortion and the ABC judgment, prison violence, overcrowding and sanitation and traveller’s rights. The review marked an opportunity for people in Ireland to highlight important human rights issues which face the country, and to encourage Ireland to promise to address these issues in front of an audience of their international peers.

The Minister made some positive statements such as confirming that a Referendum on children’s rights would be held early in 2012 in order to bring Ireland into line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. He acknowledged the urgent need to modernise our mental capacity legislation in order to protect those who are vulnerable in society. He also outlined a commitment to ratify the optional protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which would allow individuals to complain about alleged violations of these rights at an international level.

However, it has been noted that the Minister was short on detail in response to questions on other issues that are related to human rights protection in Ireland. For instance, the Minister noted the government are preparing legislation to enable it to ratify the Optional Protocol under the UN Convention against Torture. This is an important development and would require the establishment of a national body to monitor places of detention. However, the Minister failed to go into detail on the substance of that legislation or to give any timeline for its implementation. Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) Director Mark Kelly has commented that while Mr. Shatter appears to be sincere in his intentions, concrete action will be required to meet the promises made by Mr. Shatter at the review.

On the 11^th October, the UN Human Rights Council adopted its ‘Outcome Report’ on Ireland. This contained a summary of what was discussed at the hearing and a list of recommendations for Ireland to improve the human rights situation. This will be formally adopted at a hearing in March 2012, where Ireland, The United Nations Human Rights Council, and NGOs will be able to discuss the report and the obligations which Ireland are required to meet.  Once this report is formally adopted, it will form the basis on which Ireland’s human rights performance will be measured for the coming 4 years.

We believe that the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is an essential part of improving the human rights situation in all countries and to address human rights violations whenever they occur. It has allowed for civil society to contribute to the examination of Ireland by highlighting the human rights issues of concern which are facing Ireland today and providing evidence of this to the United Nations about how they are affecting people on the ground.

Brophy Solicitors

13.10.11

EU TREATY RIGHTS: RIGHTS OF RESIDENCE IN THE EVENT OF SEPARATION

We are currently challenging a decision of the Department to revoke our client’s permission to reside in the State in circumstances where he has lived with his Union citizen wife for five years and is now separated but not divorced. As we have noted in our previous blog posts, there appears to be a lacuna in Directive 2004/38/EC and the Regulations with respect of residency rights of third country national spouses who have separated from their Union citizen husband or wife but have not yet obtained a divorce. This is one such case in which we are arguing that our client retains his right to reside despite the separation pursuant to Article 13, Directive 2004/38/EC. 

Our client is a non-EEA national who married and resided with an Union citizen between September 2005 and March 2010. During the period of their marriage, both husband and wife were working or studying. The couple separated in March 2010 and our client’s wife has now left the State. The Department then sought to revoke our client’s permission to reside in the State on the basis that his marriage to an Union citizen had broken down. We responded making submissions that our client retains his right to reside in the State pursuant to Article 13 of Directive 2004/38. 

Article 13(2) relates to the right of residence by non-EEA family members in the event of divorce, annulment of marriage, or termination of registered partnership. The relevant section states:  

2. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of the registered partnership referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2 shall not entail loss of the right of residence of a Union citizen's family members who are not nationals of a Member State where:

(a) prior to initiation of the divorce or annulment proceedings or termination of the registered partnership referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2, the marriage or registered partnership has lasted at least three years, including one year in the host Member State ...

Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the right of residence of the persons concerned shall remain subject to the requirement that they are able to show that they are workers or self-employed persons or that they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State, or that they are members of the family, already constituted in the host Member State, of a person satisfying these requirements. "Sufficient resources" shall be as defined in Article 8(4).

Such family members shall retain their right of residence exclusively on personal basis.

On behalf of our client, we are arguing that it would be contrary to our Constitution’s recognition of the special position of the family in the State, the need to protect the institution of the family, and the restrictions which the State impose on the obtaining of divorce (including the need to live apart for four years), to require a spouse, whose marriage is in difficulty and has led to separation, to divorce in order to avail of the residence protections provided for in Directive 2004/38/EC. 

In arguing that the residency protections in Directive 2004/38/EC should extend to our client who is separated, but not divorced, we are relying on Recital 15 of the Directive that provides:

“Family members should be legally safeguarded in the event of the death of the Union citizen, divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of a registered partnership. With due regard for family life and human dignity, and in certain conditions to guard against abuse, measures should therefore be taken to ensure that in such circumstances family members already residing within the territory of the host Member State retain their right of residence exclusively on a personal basis.”

It appears from the recital, that the provisions of Article 13 of Directive 38/2004/EC should be purposively construed such that a third national spouse of a Union citizen retains his or her right of residence where there has been a marital separation, but not a divorce. Otherwise, it becomes necessary for the couple to divorce in order for the third country national spouse to retain a right of residence which appears to be an encouragement to divorce, and is contrary to our Constitution. A further difficultly in Ireland is that under Irish law a couple must live apart for four years before a decree of divorce can be granted.

We will keep you updated on the progress of our challenge. If you have any questions or comments, please contact us!

Brophy Solicitors

12.10.11

ECHR DECISION: SERIOUS OFFENCES, FAMILY LIFE AND RELIANCE ON ARTICLE 8

A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in AA v United Kingdom (8000/08) [2011] ECHR 1345 (20 September 2011) determined that a young Nigerian applicant’s return to Nigeria would violate his Article 8 right to respect for his private life as a young adult. The decision provides helpful consideration on the proportionality exercise where a serious offence has been committed but appears to be less instructive on whether relationships between adult children and their parents/siblings may constitute family life for the purposes of Article 8.  

The facts in brief were as follows: a Nigerian had arrived lawfully in the UK at 13 years to join his mother and two sisters. At the age of 15, he was convicted of raping a 13 year old girl for which he was sentenced to 4 years youth detention. On completion of his sentence, the applicant achieved academically, maintained family ties with his mother and adult sisters, and did not re-offended and was found to be at low risk of re-offending. The UK Home Office sought to deport the applicant, relying on the serious criminal offence committed and the absence of any family life within the terms of Article 8. The Strasbourg Court held that the deportation of the applicant would violate his Article 8 right to respect for his private life.

The majority of the Court’s considerations were with respect of whether deportation was necessary for the “prevention of disorder or crime” as was contended by the UK government. The Court noted a number of factors that mitigated against the seriousness of the original offence. Of particular importance was the fact that since his release from detention seven years ago - and the court took the date of its own consideration as the relevant date in line with its approach in Article 3 cases - the applicant had done nothing to support the UK government's contention that his deportation was necessary for the 'prevention of disorder or crime'. The Court noted that the offence was committed whilst the applicant was a minor and the best interest of the child were not furthered by severing family ties necessary for reintegration of a child offender. The Court placed reliance on the significant period that had elapsed since the offending behaviour and the impressive achievements of the applicant during this time. Reliance was also placed on the fact that the UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal had previously accepted that the applicant presented a low risk of re-offending. Overall, the likelihood of the applicant engaging in further criminal behaviour was held to be a key consideration where risk to public order was being relied on as the legitimate aim justifying expulsion.

With respect of the Applicant’s family life, the Court noted that the applicant had spent half his life in the UK maintaining relationship with his mother and sisters and had not had contact with his father, residing in Nigeria, since 1991. The Court’s conclusions with respect of the Applicant’s family life in the UK were brief and stated as follows:
"Finally, as regards the applicant's ties with the United Kingdom and with Nigeria, the Court observes that the applicant continues to reside with his mother and has close relationships with his two sisters and an uncle, all of whom reside in England. He has completed the majority of his high school and further education in the United Kingdom and has now commenced a career with a local authority in London. He is also a member of a church community. While he spent a significant period of his childhood in Nigeria, he has now not visited the country for eleven years. He has had no contact with his father since 1991."

Essentially, there was no clarification by the Court in this decision on whether relationships between adult children and parents/siblings can amount to family life in deportation cases. The majority of the Court’s considerations related to whether deportation served a legitimate aim of the “prevention of disorder and crime”.

Lourdes Peroni, in her recent blog post on the UK Human Rights blog provides an extremely instructive overview and discussion of the Court’s decisions on the status of relationships between adult children and parents/siblings and family life for the purposes of Article 8, with a starting point as the Court’s decision in this case of AA. Ms Peroni notes that while in Maslow v. Austria such family ties were accepted as constituting family life, where the young adult did not yet have family of their own, in the earlier decision of Slivenko v. Latvia it was held that an additional element of dependence would be needed for such relationships to constitute family life.

While the decision in AA therefore does not provide clarity on the status of relationships between adult family members for the purposes of Article 8, it does assist in clarifying what factors are to be accorded weight in the proportionality exercise where a serious criminal offence has been committed.  Finding that removal of the applicant to Nigeria would constitute a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court concluded:
"The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the applicant's deportation from the United Kingdom would be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of the "prevention of disorder and crime" and would therefore not be necessary in a democratic society. There would accordingly be a violation of Article 8 of the Convention if the applicant were deported to Nigeria."

Brophy Solicitors

04.10.11

BROPHY SOLICITORS CASE ANALYSIS - EZENWAKA

Judge Hogan’s interesting judgement in Ezenwaka!

Ezenwaka & Anor – v- MJELR [2011] IEHC 328

BACKGROUND:

This judgment makes for good reading. It concerns a Nigerian mother Ms Ezenwaka, and her two children who in error, were granted a visa to enter the State and join Mr. Ezenwaka (husband to Ms. Ezenwaka and father to her children).  He was resident in Ireland under the IBC Scheme, a scheme which did not permit such family members to join a beneficiary under the scheme in the State.

Mr. Ezenwaka is the father of an Irish child, Samuel but was not married to the mother of his child.  He had on one occasion returned to Nigeria to see his wife and children and felt he needed to be re-united with them.  A ‘D Type’ Visa was granted permitting family reunification by the Irish embassy in Abuja in 2008.   On the basis of this, the Ezenwakas significantly altered their position in Nigeria.  Ms. Ezenwaka sold her car, moved out of the family home, gave up her job and purchased tickets for the flight in anticipation of a permanent move to Ireland. 

The family was refused entry to the State by immigration officials at Dublin Airport who formed the opinion that the visas had been issued in error and this was confirmed by contact with the Minister’s office who in turn explained that the IBC 05 policy did not cover this situation.  The officials discovered that the Irish citizen child had been born to another woman who was not Mr. Ezenwaka’s wife.

Accordingly Ms. Ezenwaka and her two children returned to Nigeria were they remained ever since. 

ANALYSIS:

Judge Hogan commented that ‘there is no doubt but that this entire episode was deeply disappointing- perhaps even traumatic – for the Ezenwakas.  Certainly, it is not difficult to imagine the acute anguish and hardship which the family must have endured by agreeing to leave Nigeria permanently and o make a long journey to Ireland via Turkey, only to find that they are the victims of the unfortunate bureaucratic misunderstanding.’   The judge maintained that it was clear that the Ezenwakas had a legitimate expectation that they would be permitted to land ‘subject to other conditions..’

The immigration notice that issued to the family was issued pursuant to Section 4 (3) (j) of the Immigration Act, 2004 on the ground that their admission into the State would be contrary to public policy.  The judge took issue with the decision to refuse based on ‘public policy’ as specified under the act i.e. it connotes a situation where that personal conduct of the immigrant poses a real and immediate threat to the fundamental policy interests of the State.   In the present case, the judge commented that while the State was fully entitled as a matter of policy to restrict the operation of the IBC Scheme, and to take the view that the admission of this family did not come within the scope of that policy, ‘the concept of public policy in the context in which the phrase appears in s.4(3)(j) is a very different one. Neither Ms. Ezenwaka nor her children pose a threat to Irish public policy in that particular sense of the term.’  

The judge also went on to say that the operation of the IBC Scheme could not exclude the possibility of exceptional and special cases.  He took the view that the Ezenwakas were given no effective opportunity to address their case by reason of their special and unique circumstances. 

In conclusion, Judge Hogan held that the decision of the immigration officials to refuse entry to the State should be quashed as it was based on an incorrect interpretation of the term ‘public policy’ in s 4 (3)(j).   He held the decision was invalid since it was premised on the application of a fixed policy which did not take account of the unique position of the Ezenwakas.   The Minister was directed to re-consider any fresh application made by the Ezenwakas for admission to the State.  He will be required to consider ‘whether any exceptions to the existing policy should be made for the Ezenwakas in light of the hardships they have suffered and the implications (if any) the making of any exceptions might have for the fair and consistent application of the scheme for other cases.’

OUR THOUGHTS:

It is somewhat refreshing to read Judge Hogan’s findings in Ezenwaka.  The case demonstrates the strict application of Ministerial Schemes such as the IBC 05 scheme which removes any opportunity for consideration and determination of special or unique cases.  The judge went above and beyond determining the extent to which the State would be held liable for mistakes of its officials and went on to scrutinise the personal situation of the applicants, the incorrect application of the phrase ‘public policy’ as well as the problems that attach to rigid inflexible policies.    While any fresh application ultimately rests in the hands of the Minister, at least the Ezenwakas have a second chance of admission to the State even though this chance arises three years after they were initially refused entry. 

For more the full judgement click HERE

AG’S OPINION THAT RETURNS TO GREECE RISK BREACHING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Advocate General Verina Trstenjak last week issued an opinion in a Preliminary Reference Case C-493/10 from the Irish courts regarding the transfer of asylum seekers from Ireland to Greece. The case mirrors the issues determined by the European Court of Human Rights in MSS v Belgium and Greece, which we discussed in our previous posting. The cases essentially concern whether return of an asylum applicant to Greece from a transferring Member State under the Dublin Two Regulations  risks breaching the applicant’s fundamental rights and whether such a transfer would be contrary to EU law. 

The recent reference from Ireland (arising out of M. E. and others v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform) to the Court of Justice concerns five asylum applicants from Afghanistan, Iran and Algeria who had entered and travelled through Greece as illegal entrants but who had not claimed asylum there. The principal issue to be determined by the Court and that is considered by Advocate General Trstenjak in her opinion is whether the transfer of these asylum seekers to Greece may constitute a risk of a serious breach of their fundamental rights.

You may recall, in the case, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, an Afghan asylum seeker entered the EU through Greece en route to Belgium where he claimed asylum. The Belgium authorities attempted to transfer the Applicant back to Greece to have his asylum case heard there pursuant to the “Dublin 2 Regulations”. However, the judges in the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that the poor living conditions and detention facilities for asylum seekers in Greece amounted to inhumane and degrading treatment, and as such the transfer to Greece would be a beach of the Applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

In her opinion, the Advocate General Trstenjak considers under what conditions it might be appropriate, or even obligatory, under EU law, for Ireland and the United Kingdom (who also made a reference and the cases were joined), notwithstanding the primary responsibility of Greece for the applications, themselves to undertake the examination of those asylum applications. 

The Advocate General opines that the transferring Member State when determining whether to examine an asylum application for which it is not responsible, is required to have regard for the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The Advocate General notes that the Greek asylum system is considerably overburdened and can no longer guarantee that asylum applications will be dealt with in compliance with EU law. She therefore argues that it cannot be ruled out that asylum seekers who are transferred to Greece may, following their transfer, be treated in a manner which is incompatible with the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.^. 

The AG's opinion concludes therefore that the transferring Member States, the United Kingdom and Ireland, are obliged to assume responsibility under Regulation No 343/2003 and must themselves examine the asylum application. 

It may also be of interest to note that the AIRE Centre and Amnesty International are third party interveners in this case and have issued a press release summarising the key findings in the opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak. 

Brophy Solicitors

26.09.11

ZAMBRANO : THE UK AND IRISH POSITION COMPARED

The following statement was recently posted on the UK Border Agency Website;

“The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) recently handed down judgment in the case of Ruiz Zambrano (C-34/09). This judgement creates a right to reside and work for the sole carer of a dependent British citizen when that carer has no other right of residence in the UK and removing the carer from the UK would mean the British citizen would have to leave the European Union. The UK Border Agency has been considering the effect of this judgement and whether any changes are required to our policy or the law as a result. Until now, we have not accepted applications we have received on this basis as there is currently no provision within the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 (the regulations) to issue documentation on this basis.

We will amend the regulations in due course to enable a person to be issued with a document confirming that they have a right to live in the UK as a result of the Ruiz Zambrano judgement. However, in the meantime, we will issue a certificate of application to those who are able to show:

evidence that the dependent national is a British citizen;

evidence of the relationship between the applicant and the British citizen; and

adequate evidence of dependency between the applicant and the British citizen.

This certificate will enable a person to work in the UK while their application is outstanding. Once changes to the regulations are made, the application will be given full consideration and documentation will be issued under the regulations to those who meet the final agreed policy.”

The UK position is now clear in a number of respects;

In order for rights to arise pursuant to the Zambrano case (or Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union), the applicant must be the parent of a British citizen child, as opposed to the parent of a child of a different Member State citizenship.  The reasoning is that in order for a right to reside for the third country national parent to arise, there must be a risk that the Union Citizen child would be forced to leave the territory of the Member States if that right was not granted, such as the Columbian parents of the Belgium children in Zambrano. The argument that the rights arising from Zambrano will only have effect if the child is to be removed from the territory of the Member States has also been raised in some of our cases in the High Court, and we expect this point will be fully argued out in upcoming hearings in the next court term.

The Irish position is also that the Zambrano judgement applies only where the child is of Irish nationality within Ireland.  However, contradictory policy statements have been made by the Minister in respect of which persons come within the remit of the Zambrano case. Initially, it was indicated that parents of Irish citizen children who are outside the State do come within the ambit of Zambrano, and last week our office received a positive determination on one such case. However, contradictorily, the current policy statement is stated on the INIS website as follows;

“I am a non-EEA national. I lived in Ireland for some years but left some time ago to return to my country of origin. I left voluntarily and was never the subject of a Deportation Order. I am the parent of an Irish born citizen child. Can I rely on the Zambrano Judgment to allow me to reside in Ireland?

Response 3

No. The Zambrano Judgment does not apply to any person who left Ireland of their own volition. Such persons can, of course, apply for a visitor or study visa to visit Ireland but cannot rely on the Zambrano Judgment as a basis to obtain a right of residence in Ireland.”

The idea that the rights arising from Zambrano do not apply to parents outside the State has created a most unusual situation – those parents who follow correct procedure by applying for a visa to enter the State with or to join their Irish citizen child will be refused, when those who enter the State without a visa can immediately submit an application for permission to reside and work and  expect to be approved within a number of months. This categorization of parents of Irish children between those resident within or outside of the State is simply nonsensical .

In the above statement, the Border Agency’s use of the word “sole carer” would seem to exclude from the ambit of Zambrano a parent where that child’s other parent has lawful residence and can continue to reside in the Member States with the child. Such an interpretation appears to place greater weight of a child’s right of free movement as compared to a child’s right to the company of both parents, and is difficult to reconcile with the “Best Interests of the Child Principle”, confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights as the primary factor in cases involving children.

In describing the EEA national from whom the Treaty rights derive, the UK Border Agency uses the term “dependant British citizen”, while the Minster of Justice in public statements has referred to “dependant minor children”. The Irish interpretation that the Union Citizen child must be a minor child excludes those children who are between the age of 18 and 23 in full time education. In one such case we act on, the Minister has explicitly confirmed that Zamrbano does not apply to a 20 year old Irish citizen who is in full time education and fully dependant on her Pakistani father. A deportation order has been issued against her father, and if effected, she will be required to return to Pakistan.

The use of the phrase “carer ” of a British citizen if also of note. In a recent correspondence received from the Department of Justice, our client who is the father of an Union Citizen child  has been requested to provide evidence that he is the “primary carer” of that child. The Department have taken a position that our client is not a primary carer because he is in full time employment and the child is predominantly looked after by the mother while the father works. The fact the family is solely financially supported by the child’s father appears not to considered as significant as the role of the mother who is caring for the child.

We note that the Border Agency has confirmed that the UK will be making amendments to  the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006  to provide a right to reside for persons falling within the ambit of the Zambrano Judgment. Given the interpretations as highlight above, we hope they wait for further clarification for the Court of Justice before implementing these amendments!

Pending the proposed statutory amendments, the UK has undertaken to provide applicants pursuant to Zambrano temporary rights to reside and work pending determination of their applications.  This is a very welcome and necessary development. The Department of Justice has not taken this step. Here in Ireland, applicants pursuant to Zambrano, (or pursuant to Chen for that matter)  are not issued with temporary permission to remain, or permission to work, while their applications are being processed. This position is inconsistent with the process applied to those applicants pursuant to Directive 2004/38/EC, who are issued with six month temporary permission to remain and work on submitting a valid application. We see no reason why applicants pursuant to Chen and Zambrano (which are actually pursuant to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union) should be treated very much less favourably than applicants pursuant to Directive 2004/38/EC.  The Department of Justice is in effect operating a two tier system of rights, depending on whether the family member of a Union Citizen does or does not fall within the terms of the Directive. We think this is illogical, but also discriminatory.

We have been informed that the Minster has set up a special unit within the Repatriation Section to process applications pursuant. We can only presume that internal guidelines have been prepared to clarify the parameters of that case and the system which will be applied to processing the applications. The current processing system is unclear. For example, it has been indicated to us in Department of Justice correspondences that Zambrano applications are being considered in chronological order. However, in reality this appears not to be the case given the very inconsistent time frames in which our clients are receiving determinations.

We call on the Minister to follow the UK example and provide a clear public policy statement setting out the ambit of the Zambrano case, and confirming the details of a fair and transparent processing system for  these applications. In particular, we request that all Zambrano/Chen applicants be provided with temporary permission to remain pending determination of the Application. We also request that the Minster revert to his initial policy of including all parents of Irish citizen children within the remit of Zambrano.

23.9.11

Brophy Solicitors