Lessons from the Heated Debate on Immigration in the UK

The UK Home Secretary, Theresa May is again under the spotlight on immigration front. Following soon after ‘catgate’, she has spent the week fending off calls for her resignation.  

The Home Secretary is under fire for an instruction to her officials to relax checks on EU biometric passport holders at UK ports and airports during the busy summer period. According to the Home Secretary, officials in the UK Border Agency subsequently went beyond her instruction, relaxing checks on EU non-biometric passports. It is unclear at this stage who authorised what. There have been heated exchanges between the UK Border Agency and the Home Secretary with the head of the UK Border Agency, Brodie Clarke resigning and claiming constructive dismissal.  

It is striking that such a trivial matter can create such a media storm. Observed from afar, the political debate on immigration in the UK time and time again shows itself as reactionary, negative and misinformed.  

This particular debate appears to overlook some basic facts about illegal immigration. That is, the vast majority of migrants to the UK enter legally with a valid work, student or visitor visa – and many then overstay their permitted period and become illegal migrants. Illegal entry and forged passports are not the main problems for the UK Border Agency. Also, as Alan Travis in the Guardian points out, Theresa May’s rationale behind the relaxed checks seems sound: targeted checks are more effective at identifying illegal migrants whereas blanket checks mean more delays and are resource intensive.  

The UK example should be instructive to our own media and public debate. The media has an important role in informing people’s opinions on asylum seekers, refugees and migrants generally and can feed into fuelling racial prejudices and ‘flood gate’ fears. It is worth bearing in mind that the evidence on which media reports are based is often shaky. A recent report by the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford identified ten problems with the evidence informing such a debate on immigration. The report shows how difficult it is to accurately assess for example the impact migration has on public services, or even at establishing basic figures for how many illegal immigrants there are in the country.  

We anticipate more difficult times ahead for Theresa May holding what seems to be the poisoned chalice of Cabinet postings. Meanwhile, we hope that our own political and media debate retains a sense of proportion avoids the Daily Mail sensationalism of the UK.  

Brophy Solicitors  

16.11.11  

HIGH COURT CHALLENGE TO MINISTER'S REFUSAL TO PROCESS AFGHAN REFUGEE’S APPLICATION FOR FAMILY REUNIFICATION

This morning, Mr Justice Peart of the High Court granted our client leave to bring Judicial Review proceedings against the Minister for refusing to process and determine his application for Family Reunification in respect of his wife and young daughter. Our client, who is an Afghan refugee, submitted the application for Family Reunification for his wife and daughter in November 2009, some two years ago. 

When we were first instructed on the case in August 2011, we made strong submissions to the Minister that our client had a statutory entitlement to be reunited with his wife and daughter, pursuant to Section 18 of the Refugee Act 1996 as amended. We also submitted that the delay in determining the application was in breach of our clients rights under Irish and EU law, and highlighted previous guidance from the High Court that a reasonable processing timeframe would be between six and twelve months.

To the distress of our client, the Family Reunification Section responded to confirm that his application had been “on hold” since September 2010 because the Minister was investigating his case for a possible revocation of his refugee status. Our client had never been notified of this proposal to revoke his refugee status, or the postponement of this family reunification application. Furthermore, he had no understanding as to what grounds the Minister was making this proposal.  We wrote numerous letters to the Minster Decisions Unit of the Department seeking a copy of the notification of a proposal to revoke and the grounds upon which this proposal was made, but neither were provided to us in breach of the Minister’s statutory obligation pursuant to Section 21 (3) of the Refugee Act 1996.  Meanwhile, the Family Reunification Section continued to refuse to process and determine the application.

 

Our client was initially very reluctant to resolve this matter by way of High Court proceedings, as he previously had to bring a High Court case to challenge the initial refusal of the Minister to grant him refugee status, and that process had taken approximately three years. We therefore submitted a Freedom of Information Application to the Minister in an attempt to find out what reasons the Minister had for refusing to process his family reunification application and proposing to revoke his refugee status. Unfortunately, nearly all the relevant documents were withheld on the basis that an investigation was being carried out.

Our client is understandably distraught by the on going delay of two years in determining his application for Family Reunification. His wife is now pregnant with their second child and they live in very difficult conditions as exiled refugees in Pakistan. The family had hoped and planned to have their child born in Ireland, in which case he or she would be an Irish citizen by birth.  Our client was therefore left with no option but to bring the matter to the High Court to seek an order compelling the Minister to proceed with his application to be reunited with his family.

Despite the fact that leave to bring Judicial Review proceedings has now been issued, we hope for our client’s sake that this matter can still be resolved in the short term. If the Minister provides an undertaking to consider and determine the family reunification application within the coming weeks, and provides our client with a proper proposal to revoke refugee status clearly stating the grounds upon which the proposal is made, there would be no need for the case to proceed to a substantive hearing before the High Court. In this way, lengthy further delays would be avoided for our clients, as would substantial legal costs.

8.11.11

Brophy Solicitors

INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS IN RESPECT OF RESIDENCY APPLICATIONS

The case of an Angolan teenager named Mauro Manuel has been receiving alot of media attention this week becuase the young boy has lost his fight to stay in the Netherland despite a plea by him to the Dutch parliament and countless support from the general public for his case.

Mauro has been living in the Dutch province of Limburg with a foster family since he arrived in the Netherlands as an unaccompanied asylum seeker at the age of ten in 2003. During this time, Mauro had  become very settled in the Netherlands.  He currently lives with foster parents who have recently had a son who Mauro counts as his little brother. Mauro even speaks fluent Dutch and with the added touch of the unmistakeable Limburg drawl. He is also studying a vocational course at college. It would seem by any reasonable standard that Mauro is extremely integrated in the local community and in Dutch society. 

The decision against Mauro was made by Dutch MPs who voted down two motions on Tuesday last which would have allowed him to stay in the country permanently. They are expected to vote next week on a compromise solution which would allow him to stay to hear whether or not an application for a temporary four-year visa as a student would be successful.

On the day when the decision was been made by parliament, Mauro had the support of 700 supporters and celebrities to submit a petition which was signed by more that 55,000 people. All of these people are in agreement that Mauro, an integrated member of the community should be given the right to remain in the place that he regards his home place. Mauro also enjoys support from groups such as the United Nations children’s agency, Unicef, who have stated that if Mauro was to be deported now, at a time when he is fully established and integrated in Dutch society, it would be in contravention of the UN Convention on Children’s Rights and would have serious repercussions for his development. 

The case of Mauro raises questions regarding the proper weight a State should give to the integration of an applicant within the community in respect of their application to remain in that State. If Mauro is deemed not sufficiently integrated into the life and Society of Netherlands to permit him to stay, then what is actually required for someone to be deemed to be permitted to remain in the community?  

The Dutch Immigration and Asylum Minister Gerd Leers ruled that Mauro had no right to stay in the Netherlands due to the fact that there were many others in Mauro’s situation and that therefore an exception could not be made.  In Ireland, the policies applied by the State to justify refusal of residence/visa applications, or to ground deportations include the obligation to protect the integrity of our immigration system, the State welfare system, control of borders, etc. Such policies are of course important. But where does the correct balance lie in circumstances such as Mauro’s case where an individual is fully established and integrated in the State?

National policies which attempt to control and manage immigration are legitimate and necessary, but must be applied relative to the individual facts of the each case. Blanket policies applied systematically can lead to unreasonable, unfair and perhaps unlawful decisions.

GUARDIANSHIP

We have recently received a number of queries in relation to legal guardianship from persons who wish to apply to the Minister for permission to reside on the basis of their parental role with an Irish citizen child.  Some of the queries relate to unmarried fathers who are no longer in a relationship with the mother of their child, and are in disagreement regarding custody and access to their child. Other cases involve persons who are not the natural parent of the child, but are married to the child’s parent, and are in every other way like a parent to the child. An understanding of the law of guardianship is required to establish what residency rights such parents acquire through their relationship to the Irish citizen child. The following is a short summary of this subject;

Guardianship is a collection of rights and duties which a parent has in respect of their child. The guardian has a duty to maintain and properly care for their child and to make decisions in areas such as the child’s religion, school, adoption, medical treatment. Only natural parents can be guardians of their children if the parents continue to be alive.

When the parents of the child are not married to one another, only the mother of the child is automatically a guardian. The unmarried father is not automatically a legal guardian of his child, and must apply to the local district court to be appointed a joint guardian of his child. An unmarried father can become a guardian by agreement with the mother where the father and mother can fill up and sign a statutory declaration for joint guardianship (S.I No 5 of 1998). The mother’s views are not determinative by the court in making the decision. The fact that the mother may not consent does not mean that the court will refuse the order for guardianship sought by the father. Any decision by the court will be made in the best interests of the child.

If the parents of the child marry each other following the birth of their child, then the father automatically becomes a joint guardian with the mother as long as the child has not be adopted and the mother was not married 10 months before the birth of the child.

If the mother marries a man who is not the father of her child, there is no legal relationship between her husband and her child. If the birth father is a joint guardian he remains a joint guardian of his child. If the mother and her husband wish to adopt the child and the father is a joint guardian, his consent to the adoption is required. If a father is not a joint guardian he has a right to be consulted about the adoption. If the child is adopted the father loses all legal rights in relation to the child.

When a woman has a child outside marriage and goes on to marry a man who is not the father of her child there may be a desire to establish a legal link between her husband and child. This may only be done in Ireland by having the child adopted by the married couple. This means that the biological mother becomes the adoptive mother of her own child and the step father becomes the adoptive father with all he rights and responsibilities to the child as if the child had been born into the marriage. It means that the biological father will have no further rights or responsibilities to the child and will not have the possibility of getting rights in the future.

The adoption creates a legal family unit with constitutional protection as if the child had been born into that family unit. It gives full parental rights and responsibilities to the adoptive father and this is especially important in the event of the death of the mother.

Parents who are guardians but especially mothers who are sole guardians, should make a will appointing a guardian to act on their behalf in the event if their death before the child is 18. This is called a testamentary guardianship. The surviving guardian if there is one then acts jointly with the testamentary guardian. If a parent dies without appointing a guardian in a will, it is possible for someone with an interest in the child to apply to the court to be appointed a guardian of the child.

Changes to Reference Numbering under a new INIS Information Technology System

A new Information Technology system is being introduced in the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS) including the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC), The Appeals Tribunal (RAT0 and the Reception and Integration Agency (RIA).

The new system will allow INIS to be more efficient in associating queries with individual applications and in directing queries to the relevant processing areas. This will simplify the process of checking the status of cases and lead to improvements in the way that INIS handles such queries. It will enable the most up to date information to be available to case workers and decision makers in a more structured way which will improve efficiency and effectiveness. It will involve the replacement of the existing file numbering system with a new single INIS approach to case numbering. The new numbers will be issued to both existing and new applicants.

The new system includes two types of identity or reference number. These are a person identity number and a separate application reference number.  The person identity number will be in the format of a number followed by a year –the year based on the first application lodged to INIS. The application reference number will include a number, information regarding each application type, and the year the application was made.

Existing applicants and their cases will be assigned both a new person identity number and a new application reference number. Applicants or their representatives should quote the new numbers in any correspondence with INIS and associated agencies.

Letters from INIS will continue to include existing file reference numbers in addition to the new reference numbers in order to avoid confusion and to allow for a smooth transition to the new system. The existing file reference numbers will be included as a cross reference for older cases, these will gradually cease to be used over a period of time.

New applicants will be allocated a person identity number and/or an application reference number. They will not be allocated an old number.

The new reference number will not to visa applications where the existing reference numbering system for visa applications will not be changed.

Brophy Solicitors

27.10.11

Special Extension of Permission to Remain for Timed – Out Students from October 1st 2011.

The Minister for Justice has recognised that the current economic climate posed challenges for both Irish citizens who sought employment and for students who wished to pursue a work permit or green card. According to recent guidelines on the INIS website, the Department of Justice will now allow certain categories of ‘timed out’ students to register for a further three months in order to address their immigration status. This concession will apply to non – EEA students whose permission to remain in Ireland expires after October 1^st 2011 where the students were legally resident in Ireland for seven years on January 1^st, 2011 and who have availed of the six month extension on their residence and who had kept their permission up to date. It also applies to students who were resident in Ireland for seven years on January 1^st, 2011 and who have availed of the Irish Third Level Graduate Scheme.

Students shall be permitted to work during the three month concession period as they would be on their academic holidays. However, they will not be permitted to enrol on any further educational course. The ultimate purpose of the extension is to allow these students to address their immigration status or to make arrangements to leave the state. Eligible students can apply for an employment permit or green card during this time without been required to return to their country of origin.

At the end of the three month period, the student will either be classified as a worker with an employment permit (Stamp 1) or, if they fail to secure an employment permit in that time, their permission to be in the state will expire.

This special three month concession will not apply to students who do not meet the above criteria. It will also fail to apply to Stamp 1A holders.

Students who have not kept their permission up to date will only receive the balance of their six month timed out extension. The concession will not apply to students whose permission expires from January 1^st, 2012.

A summary of the Student Regime

The Department of Justice’s current regime for non- EEA students commenced in January 2011. This regime allowed language and non – degree programme students permission to reside in the State for a maximum period for three years and degree programme students were permitted to reside in the State for a maximum period of seven years. A language and non – degree programme student could progress to a degree programme and extend their permitted period of residence, however, the maximum period of residence permitted for any student is seven years.

Some interim arrangements were put in place for non – EEA students who were residing in Ireland before January 1^st, 2011 and who had exceeded the permitted duration of stay as a student because of the commencement of the new rules.

Language and non – degree programme students who had completed their three years and whose residence permission expired after January were permitted to register if they were commencing the second year of a non- language programme. However, the overall maximum limit of seven years residence as a student applies.

Students whose immigration permission expired between January and the 30^th September, 2011 were entitled to six month extension to their permission, where they had exceeded the new time limits. Students could work during the six month concession period on the same terms as during the academic holidays. They could also apply for an employment permit or green card during this time without having to first return to their country of origin.

Degree programme students who had completed the seven years of study and whose residence permission expired after January were permitted to register only if they were commencing their second year of a degree programme. They will be permitted to complete the course.

When the new rules came into force, it emerged that some courses in vocational and business areas did not meet the criteria for degree programme courses here. However, they were validated by overseas bodies. In order to avoid disadvantaging students who had enrolled in these courses in good faith, a temporary arrangement was put in place which would allow these students who had exceeded the three year limit which applied to language and non- degree programmes and whose registration was due to expire to enrol for a course of this type for one year. However, the student was still bound to avoid exceeding the overall seven year time limit. This concession ended on July 1^st, 2011.

Students who could not avail of these options were required to make arrangements to leave the state.

Irish Third Level Graduate Scheme

The Irish Third Level Graduate Scheme allows legally resident third level graduates to remain in Ireland for the purposes of seeking employment and applying for a green card or work permit. A six month permission is available for graduates with a qualification at NFQ level 7 while a twelve month permission is available to graduates with a qualification at NFQ level 8 or 9. This scheme allows legally resident non – EEA third level graduates to remain in Ireland for the purpose of seeking employment and applying for a green card or employment permit. The student may work full time during this period of permission.

The Naturalisation Process, Ireland and the United Kingdom compared

We have recently made submissions to the Minister on behalf of a client who is waiting a determination of his application for Naturalization for a period of over four years and four months. It has been indicated that to us that our client’s application for Naturalization is being considered “in the normal way” with a view to be establishing that he has met the statutory requirements for Naturalization.

We cannot accept this response as reasonable or adequate in the circumstances of our client’s case.   He does not present as a person who would potentially be ineligible for Naturalization pursuant to the Statutory requirements of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Acts 1956 to 2004. He has lawfully resided in the State for over ten years. He is married to and EU national. He is a highly qualified person, and has always been in employment in this State. He has never come to the adverse attention to the Gardai in the State or any other country.

We recently wrote to the Minister to request to know why is this application taking over twice as long to process as the average application? Why is he being discriminated against compared to the average applicant? What has the Department been doing while processing his application over the course of four years and four months? When can our client expect to complete the processing of this application? We also indicated that we have submitted many applications for  Naturalization whereby the applicant has been found not to meet the criteria of the Citizenship Acts and these applications have been determined in periods of time far less than this client.

It was indicated to us in a responding correspondence from the Citizenship Section that should our client issue court proceedings in an attempt to compel the Minister to determine the application, that he would strictly be pursued for costs. This assertion was based on a number of judgments from the High Court from 2009 and 2010 where it was held that because Naturalization is a privilege, an applicant can not compel the Minister to determine the application  (Nawaz versus Minister for Justice, 29^th July 2009, Bepo v versus Minister for Justice 18^th June 2009, Tabi versus Minister for Justice  16^th April 2010 and Jiad versus Minister for Justice 19^th May 2010  ).

Thus, there is nothing an applicant such as our client can do put continue to wait without any understanding regarding why his application is being treated so unfavourably.

It is interesting to compare the UK Naturalization process.

Currently, the granting of a Certificate of Naturalisation is at the discretion of the Home Office. Applicants are required to be aged 18 years or over, of sound mind, intend to continue living in the United Kingdom or to maintain close links with the United Kingdom, be able to communicate in English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic to an acceptable degree, be of good character, meet certain residential requirements of five years or three years – with conditions attached to each. Applicants are also required

to have sufficient knowledge of life in the United Kingdom (with the exception of those who are over 65 years of age or are suffering from a long term mental condition preventing them from being tested on their knowledge ).

Applicants are entitled to have an acknowledgement receipt of their application within a number of weeks of submitting the application, and Applicants can accept to receive a determination of the application within a six month period. Applicants may also be required to attend an interview.

The Home Office has recently introduced strict new requirements which potential applicants will be required to meet in order to meet the criteria necessary to be approved. Applicants will now be required to have knowledge of British history in order to pass the citizenship test. Prime Minister David Cameron has noted the fact that the current test examines knowledge about the roles and powers of the main institutions of Europe and the benefits system in the United Kingdom. He is hopeful that the new test will be centred on British history and culture. It is thought that the new rule requiring knowledge of British history may prove to be a significantly more difficult obstacle for those who seek to be accepted as citizens of the United Kingdom in the future.

There is no similar requirement for knowledge of Irish history for Naturalisation in Ireland. Applications are decided upon by the Minister for Justice and Equality, who enjoys absolute discretion. Many of the general requirements are similar to the United Kingdom such as the requirement to be aged 18 or older and of good character. Applicant must intend to reside in the state after naturalisation, make a declaration of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the state, to undertake to observe the laws of the state and respect democratic values. One is also expected to be supporting themselves and their dependents while living in the state when they make their application.

The great difficulty with the Irish Naturalisation process is that it is the complete lack of  transparency. This allows for blatant disregard for fair procedures like the example of the case above.

Constitutional challenge to establish right of Irish Citizens to the company of dependant Non EEA parents

We have previously blogged about this case when it was first heard before Mr Justice Hogan in July 2011.Over the last two days, the substantive hearing of the case was heard by Mr Justice Cooke. Submissions are now complete, and we must now await the High Court's decision.

The case concerned an Irish citizen couple who have applied for permission to remain in the State for their non EEA elderly parents, who we say are dependant upon them. 

The legal argument was focused on whether Article 41 of the Constitution, which guarantees the protection of the family as the "natural primary and fundamental unit group of society" , extends to include an adult Irish citizen and their elderly dependant parents. We argued that it does, and where dependency exists between the adult citizen and their parents, Article 41 protects the Irish citizen's right to the company of their parents, in the absence of reasonable and legitimate countervailing grounds which the State may raise. The State's position was that Article 41 offered no protection to our clients whether or not dependency existed, because our clients did not constitute a family unit within the meaning of Article 41. In other words, they argued that as an adult married citizen, one can no longer regard one's parents to be part of the family unit as envisaged by Article 41. A second argument was made that the dependency link in our clients' case was not sufficient to amount to dependency in legal terms.

There is no authority in Irish law to date to establish whether a family comprising of two married couples (i.e. the married Irish citizen and the married non EEA dependant parents) derive protection from Article 41, and if so, whether such protection would require the State to grant the dependant parents permission to reside in the State. Therefore, this case was argued on novel Constitutional grounds, and if successful, could establish a very significant new Constitutional right.

We eagerly await Mr Justice Cooke's judgement, and will post a further update at that time.

Brophy Solicitors

19.10.11

PROPOSED REFERENDUM ON CHILDRENS' RIGHTS PLANNED FOR NEW YEAR

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that states act in the best interests of the child. Ireland is a signatory to the Convention and ratified it since 1992. States that ratify it are bound to it by international law. In 2006, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in Geneva expressed concern that the wording of the Irish Constitution does not allow the state to intervene in cases of abuse, other than in very exceptional cases. Therefore, the Irish Government undertook to amend the Constitution to make a more explicit commitment to children’s rights.

In his recent address to other UN member states in Geneva as part of Ireland’s Universal Periodic Review, Minister Alan Shatter said that the referendum on children’s rights will be held early in the new year. The announcement was welcomed by many groups such as Barnardos, CARI, the Children’s Rights Alliance, The Dublin Rape Crisis Centre, ISPCC, One in Four and the Rape Crisis Network of Ireland. The Irish Council for Civil Liberties said that a more definitive date was needed.

The proposed wording for a referendum on children says the following:

‘In the resolution of all disputes concerning the guardianship, adoption, custody, care or upbringing of a child, the welfare and best interests of the child shall be first and paramount consideration.’

The proposed amendment will bring Irish law in line with the current UK position, as confirmed by the recent Court of Human Rights judgement in the case of ZH (Tanzania) (concerning the removal of a non-British parent of a UK citizen child). The Court of Human Rights held that the over-arching issue is the weight to be given to the best interests of children who are affected by the decision to remove or deport one or both of their parents from the UK. In the words of Lady Hale:

‘In making the proportionality assessment under article 8, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration. This means that they must be considered first.”

The new Constitutional provision may have quiet an impact in the immigration field and the exact wording of the proposal amendment is of much interest to us.  For example, the inclusion of the word ‘upbringing’ gives scope for the argument that children have rights to be brought up in the country of their nationality. This would be a novel right under Irish law, given the current position as set down by the Supreme Court in the case of L and O case  (Lobe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2003] IESC 3 (23 January 2003). In that case the Supreme Court held that requirements of the common good, including the need to preserve the integrity of the asylum and immigration process, could justify the deportation of a parent of a citizen child and a denial of the child’s right to the care and company of their parents in the State. 

The proposed wording of the new Constitutional provision gives room to argue that the deportation of an Irish citizen child could be deemed unconstitutional if it was not in the best interests of the child’s upbringing. Could it not be argued that in most cases a child would be better off to be brought up in a developed country like Ireland, than many developing countries where standard of life may be of a lesser quality? Could it be argued that the rights of the child extend not only to parents, but other immediate family members, such as siblings?

Certainly, some discussion is necessary on how a balance may be struck between achieving the protection of the rights of children and permitting the State to act within its required duty to protect the Immigration and welfare systems. We believe that the upcoming referendum is a good opportunity to assess these sometimes conflicting rights of the State and individuals. It is an opportunity to create and improve current policy in respect of the rights of children, and their position in society.  We welcome the implementation of children’s rights into the Constitution and the State’s commitment to ensuring that children are protected and a statement by the people of Ireland about the type of society in which we would like to live.

Brophy Solicitors

14.10.11

---

[1] ZH (Tanzania)  (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) [2011] UKSC

EU TREATY RIGHTS: RIGHTS OF RESIDENCE IN THE EVENT OF SEPARATION

We are currently challenging a decision of the Department to revoke our client’s permission to reside in the State in circumstances where he has lived with his Union citizen wife for five years and is now separated but not divorced. As we have noted in our previous blog posts, there appears to be a lacuna in Directive 2004/38/EC and the Regulations with respect of residency rights of third country national spouses who have separated from their Union citizen husband or wife but have not yet obtained a divorce. This is one such case in which we are arguing that our client retains his right to reside despite the separation pursuant to Article 13, Directive 2004/38/EC. 

Our client is a non-EEA national who married and resided with an Union citizen between September 2005 and March 2010. During the period of their marriage, both husband and wife were working or studying. The couple separated in March 2010 and our client’s wife has now left the State. The Department then sought to revoke our client’s permission to reside in the State on the basis that his marriage to an Union citizen had broken down. We responded making submissions that our client retains his right to reside in the State pursuant to Article 13 of Directive 2004/38. 

Article 13(2) relates to the right of residence by non-EEA family members in the event of divorce, annulment of marriage, or termination of registered partnership. The relevant section states:  

2. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of the registered partnership referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2 shall not entail loss of the right of residence of a Union citizen's family members who are not nationals of a Member State where:

(a) prior to initiation of the divorce or annulment proceedings or termination of the registered partnership referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2, the marriage or registered partnership has lasted at least three years, including one year in the host Member State ...

Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the right of residence of the persons concerned shall remain subject to the requirement that they are able to show that they are workers or self-employed persons or that they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State, or that they are members of the family, already constituted in the host Member State, of a person satisfying these requirements. "Sufficient resources" shall be as defined in Article 8(4).

Such family members shall retain their right of residence exclusively on personal basis.

On behalf of our client, we are arguing that it would be contrary to our Constitution’s recognition of the special position of the family in the State, the need to protect the institution of the family, and the restrictions which the State impose on the obtaining of divorce (including the need to live apart for four years), to require a spouse, whose marriage is in difficulty and has led to separation, to divorce in order to avail of the residence protections provided for in Directive 2004/38/EC. 

In arguing that the residency protections in Directive 2004/38/EC should extend to our client who is separated, but not divorced, we are relying on Recital 15 of the Directive that provides:

“Family members should be legally safeguarded in the event of the death of the Union citizen, divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of a registered partnership. With due regard for family life and human dignity, and in certain conditions to guard against abuse, measures should therefore be taken to ensure that in such circumstances family members already residing within the territory of the host Member State retain their right of residence exclusively on a personal basis.”

It appears from the recital, that the provisions of Article 13 of Directive 38/2004/EC should be purposively construed such that a third national spouse of a Union citizen retains his or her right of residence where there has been a marital separation, but not a divorce. Otherwise, it becomes necessary for the couple to divorce in order for the third country national spouse to retain a right of residence which appears to be an encouragement to divorce, and is contrary to our Constitution. A further difficultly in Ireland is that under Irish law a couple must live apart for four years before a decree of divorce can be granted.

We will keep you updated on the progress of our challenge. If you have any questions or comments, please contact us!

Brophy Solicitors

12.10.11

ECHR DECISION: SERIOUS OFFENCES, FAMILY LIFE AND RELIANCE ON ARTICLE 8

A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in AA v United Kingdom (8000/08) [2011] ECHR 1345 (20 September 2011) determined that a young Nigerian applicant’s return to Nigeria would violate his Article 8 right to respect for his private life as a young adult. The decision provides helpful consideration on the proportionality exercise where a serious offence has been committed but appears to be less instructive on whether relationships between adult children and their parents/siblings may constitute family life for the purposes of Article 8.  

The facts in brief were as follows: a Nigerian had arrived lawfully in the UK at 13 years to join his mother and two sisters. At the age of 15, he was convicted of raping a 13 year old girl for which he was sentenced to 4 years youth detention. On completion of his sentence, the applicant achieved academically, maintained family ties with his mother and adult sisters, and did not re-offended and was found to be at low risk of re-offending. The UK Home Office sought to deport the applicant, relying on the serious criminal offence committed and the absence of any family life within the terms of Article 8. The Strasbourg Court held that the deportation of the applicant would violate his Article 8 right to respect for his private life.

The majority of the Court’s considerations were with respect of whether deportation was necessary for the “prevention of disorder or crime” as was contended by the UK government. The Court noted a number of factors that mitigated against the seriousness of the original offence. Of particular importance was the fact that since his release from detention seven years ago - and the court took the date of its own consideration as the relevant date in line with its approach in Article 3 cases - the applicant had done nothing to support the UK government's contention that his deportation was necessary for the 'prevention of disorder or crime'. The Court noted that the offence was committed whilst the applicant was a minor and the best interest of the child were not furthered by severing family ties necessary for reintegration of a child offender. The Court placed reliance on the significant period that had elapsed since the offending behaviour and the impressive achievements of the applicant during this time. Reliance was also placed on the fact that the UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal had previously accepted that the applicant presented a low risk of re-offending. Overall, the likelihood of the applicant engaging in further criminal behaviour was held to be a key consideration where risk to public order was being relied on as the legitimate aim justifying expulsion.

With respect of the Applicant’s family life, the Court noted that the applicant had spent half his life in the UK maintaining relationship with his mother and sisters and had not had contact with his father, residing in Nigeria, since 1991. The Court’s conclusions with respect of the Applicant’s family life in the UK were brief and stated as follows:
"Finally, as regards the applicant's ties with the United Kingdom and with Nigeria, the Court observes that the applicant continues to reside with his mother and has close relationships with his two sisters and an uncle, all of whom reside in England. He has completed the majority of his high school and further education in the United Kingdom and has now commenced a career with a local authority in London. He is also a member of a church community. While he spent a significant period of his childhood in Nigeria, he has now not visited the country for eleven years. He has had no contact with his father since 1991."

Essentially, there was no clarification by the Court in this decision on whether relationships between adult children and parents/siblings can amount to family life in deportation cases. The majority of the Court’s considerations related to whether deportation served a legitimate aim of the “prevention of disorder and crime”.

Lourdes Peroni, in her recent blog post on the UK Human Rights blog provides an extremely instructive overview and discussion of the Court’s decisions on the status of relationships between adult children and parents/siblings and family life for the purposes of Article 8, with a starting point as the Court’s decision in this case of AA. Ms Peroni notes that while in Maslow v. Austria such family ties were accepted as constituting family life, where the young adult did not yet have family of their own, in the earlier decision of Slivenko v. Latvia it was held that an additional element of dependence would be needed for such relationships to constitute family life.

While the decision in AA therefore does not provide clarity on the status of relationships between adult family members for the purposes of Article 8, it does assist in clarifying what factors are to be accorded weight in the proportionality exercise where a serious criminal offence has been committed.  Finding that removal of the applicant to Nigeria would constitute a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court concluded:
"The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the applicant's deportation from the United Kingdom would be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of the "prevention of disorder and crime" and would therefore not be necessary in a democratic society. There would accordingly be a violation of Article 8 of the Convention if the applicant were deported to Nigeria."

Brophy Solicitors

04.10.11

AG’S OPINION THAT RETURNS TO GREECE RISK BREACHING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Advocate General Verina Trstenjak last week issued an opinion in a Preliminary Reference Case C-493/10 from the Irish courts regarding the transfer of asylum seekers from Ireland to Greece. The case mirrors the issues determined by the European Court of Human Rights in MSS v Belgium and Greece, which we discussed in our previous posting. The cases essentially concern whether return of an asylum applicant to Greece from a transferring Member State under the Dublin Two Regulations  risks breaching the applicant’s fundamental rights and whether such a transfer would be contrary to EU law. 

The recent reference from Ireland (arising out of M. E. and others v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform) to the Court of Justice concerns five asylum applicants from Afghanistan, Iran and Algeria who had entered and travelled through Greece as illegal entrants but who had not claimed asylum there. The principal issue to be determined by the Court and that is considered by Advocate General Trstenjak in her opinion is whether the transfer of these asylum seekers to Greece may constitute a risk of a serious breach of their fundamental rights.

You may recall, in the case, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, an Afghan asylum seeker entered the EU through Greece en route to Belgium where he claimed asylum. The Belgium authorities attempted to transfer the Applicant back to Greece to have his asylum case heard there pursuant to the “Dublin 2 Regulations”. However, the judges in the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that the poor living conditions and detention facilities for asylum seekers in Greece amounted to inhumane and degrading treatment, and as such the transfer to Greece would be a beach of the Applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

In her opinion, the Advocate General Trstenjak considers under what conditions it might be appropriate, or even obligatory, under EU law, for Ireland and the United Kingdom (who also made a reference and the cases were joined), notwithstanding the primary responsibility of Greece for the applications, themselves to undertake the examination of those asylum applications. 

The Advocate General opines that the transferring Member State when determining whether to examine an asylum application for which it is not responsible, is required to have regard for the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The Advocate General notes that the Greek asylum system is considerably overburdened and can no longer guarantee that asylum applications will be dealt with in compliance with EU law. She therefore argues that it cannot be ruled out that asylum seekers who are transferred to Greece may, following their transfer, be treated in a manner which is incompatible with the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.^. 

The AG's opinion concludes therefore that the transferring Member States, the United Kingdom and Ireland, are obliged to assume responsibility under Regulation No 343/2003 and must themselves examine the asylum application. 

It may also be of interest to note that the AIRE Centre and Amnesty International are third party interveners in this case and have issued a press release summarising the key findings in the opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak. 

Brophy Solicitors

26.09.11

ZAMBRANO : THE UK AND IRISH POSITION COMPARED

The following statement was recently posted on the UK Border Agency Website;

“The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) recently handed down judgment in the case of Ruiz Zambrano (C-34/09). This judgement creates a right to reside and work for the sole carer of a dependent British citizen when that carer has no other right of residence in the UK and removing the carer from the UK would mean the British citizen would have to leave the European Union. The UK Border Agency has been considering the effect of this judgement and whether any changes are required to our policy or the law as a result. Until now, we have not accepted applications we have received on this basis as there is currently no provision within the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 (the regulations) to issue documentation on this basis.

We will amend the regulations in due course to enable a person to be issued with a document confirming that they have a right to live in the UK as a result of the Ruiz Zambrano judgement. However, in the meantime, we will issue a certificate of application to those who are able to show:

evidence that the dependent national is a British citizen;

evidence of the relationship between the applicant and the British citizen; and

adequate evidence of dependency between the applicant and the British citizen.

This certificate will enable a person to work in the UK while their application is outstanding. Once changes to the regulations are made, the application will be given full consideration and documentation will be issued under the regulations to those who meet the final agreed policy.”

The UK position is now clear in a number of respects;

In order for rights to arise pursuant to the Zambrano case (or Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union), the applicant must be the parent of a British citizen child, as opposed to the parent of a child of a different Member State citizenship.  The reasoning is that in order for a right to reside for the third country national parent to arise, there must be a risk that the Union Citizen child would be forced to leave the territory of the Member States if that right was not granted, such as the Columbian parents of the Belgium children in Zambrano. The argument that the rights arising from Zambrano will only have effect if the child is to be removed from the territory of the Member States has also been raised in some of our cases in the High Court, and we expect this point will be fully argued out in upcoming hearings in the next court term.

The Irish position is also that the Zambrano judgement applies only where the child is of Irish nationality within Ireland.  However, contradictory policy statements have been made by the Minister in respect of which persons come within the remit of the Zambrano case. Initially, it was indicated that parents of Irish citizen children who are outside the State do come within the ambit of Zambrano, and last week our office received a positive determination on one such case. However, contradictorily, the current policy statement is stated on the INIS website as follows;

“I am a non-EEA national. I lived in Ireland for some years but left some time ago to return to my country of origin. I left voluntarily and was never the subject of a Deportation Order. I am the parent of an Irish born citizen child. Can I rely on the Zambrano Judgment to allow me to reside in Ireland?

Response 3

No. The Zambrano Judgment does not apply to any person who left Ireland of their own volition. Such persons can, of course, apply for a visitor or study visa to visit Ireland but cannot rely on the Zambrano Judgment as a basis to obtain a right of residence in Ireland.”

The idea that the rights arising from Zambrano do not apply to parents outside the State has created a most unusual situation – those parents who follow correct procedure by applying for a visa to enter the State with or to join their Irish citizen child will be refused, when those who enter the State without a visa can immediately submit an application for permission to reside and work and  expect to be approved within a number of months. This categorization of parents of Irish children between those resident within or outside of the State is simply nonsensical .

In the above statement, the Border Agency’s use of the word “sole carer” would seem to exclude from the ambit of Zambrano a parent where that child’s other parent has lawful residence and can continue to reside in the Member States with the child. Such an interpretation appears to place greater weight of a child’s right of free movement as compared to a child’s right to the company of both parents, and is difficult to reconcile with the “Best Interests of the Child Principle”, confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights as the primary factor in cases involving children.

In describing the EEA national from whom the Treaty rights derive, the UK Border Agency uses the term “dependant British citizen”, while the Minster of Justice in public statements has referred to “dependant minor children”. The Irish interpretation that the Union Citizen child must be a minor child excludes those children who are between the age of 18 and 23 in full time education. In one such case we act on, the Minister has explicitly confirmed that Zamrbano does not apply to a 20 year old Irish citizen who is in full time education and fully dependant on her Pakistani father. A deportation order has been issued against her father, and if effected, she will be required to return to Pakistan.

The use of the phrase “carer ” of a British citizen if also of note. In a recent correspondence received from the Department of Justice, our client who is the father of an Union Citizen child  has been requested to provide evidence that he is the “primary carer” of that child. The Department have taken a position that our client is not a primary carer because he is in full time employment and the child is predominantly looked after by the mother while the father works. The fact the family is solely financially supported by the child’s father appears not to considered as significant as the role of the mother who is caring for the child.

We note that the Border Agency has confirmed that the UK will be making amendments to  the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006  to provide a right to reside for persons falling within the ambit of the Zambrano Judgment. Given the interpretations as highlight above, we hope they wait for further clarification for the Court of Justice before implementing these amendments!

Pending the proposed statutory amendments, the UK has undertaken to provide applicants pursuant to Zambrano temporary rights to reside and work pending determination of their applications.  This is a very welcome and necessary development. The Department of Justice has not taken this step. Here in Ireland, applicants pursuant to Zambrano, (or pursuant to Chen for that matter)  are not issued with temporary permission to remain, or permission to work, while their applications are being processed. This position is inconsistent with the process applied to those applicants pursuant to Directive 2004/38/EC, who are issued with six month temporary permission to remain and work on submitting a valid application. We see no reason why applicants pursuant to Chen and Zambrano (which are actually pursuant to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union) should be treated very much less favourably than applicants pursuant to Directive 2004/38/EC.  The Department of Justice is in effect operating a two tier system of rights, depending on whether the family member of a Union Citizen does or does not fall within the terms of the Directive. We think this is illogical, but also discriminatory.

We have been informed that the Minster has set up a special unit within the Repatriation Section to process applications pursuant. We can only presume that internal guidelines have been prepared to clarify the parameters of that case and the system which will be applied to processing the applications. The current processing system is unclear. For example, it has been indicated to us in Department of Justice correspondences that Zambrano applications are being considered in chronological order. However, in reality this appears not to be the case given the very inconsistent time frames in which our clients are receiving determinations.

We call on the Minister to follow the UK example and provide a clear public policy statement setting out the ambit of the Zambrano case, and confirming the details of a fair and transparent processing system for  these applications. In particular, we request that all Zambrano/Chen applicants be provided with temporary permission to remain pending determination of the Application. We also request that the Minster revert to his initial policy of including all parents of Irish citizen children within the remit of Zambrano.

23.9.11

Brophy Solicitors